Opinion polls suggest that the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) are on course to win the next German election with around 27 to 29 percent of the vote. Its lead over the second-placed Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU), led by current chancellor Friedrich Merz, is growing significantly.
German MEP Damian Boeselager, who founded the Volt party in response to the rise of populism and extremism in Europe, explained that the AfD’s success in Germany is driven by several factors, particularly the inability of political parties to carry out decisive reforms.
He regularly criticises the AfD and joined an initiative by MEPs that called on the Authority for European Political Parties to verify whether the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group, of which AfD is a member, meets the conditions for continuing to operate.
The independent authority was asked to examine whether the ESN complies with the EU’s fundamental values, such as democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. In addition to the AfD, this political family also includes Slovakia’s Republika party.
In this interview, he discusses:
- why German politicians are failing and how the AfD exploits this;
- what he sees as the remedy for populism;
- why he advocates a European federation;
- and how pan-European elections could work.
The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is now routinely topping opinion polls in Germany. What has happened for the AfD to become a political powerhouse? Have the mainstream political parties failed?
We are seeing the rise of far-right nationalist populist parties in several European countries. The reasons for their existence are very similar across the continent. It is not possible to identify a single factor; there are several.
The first is that, in my view, most people who now belong to the working generation face the problem of living in an ageing society. This results in higher costs for the healthcare and pension systems for the current generation, meaning that real wages are not actually rising; indeed, they are stagnating or falling. This in turn means that, no matter how hard you work, it is very difficult to save money and build wealth.
Most people in Germany today become wealthy through inheritance, or by marrying someone who has inherited money. I do not think it is very healthy for society when people feel that they cannot save and cannot reach their parents’ standard of living. You are somewhat dependent on whether you are fortunate enough to have been born to parents who earn more money. So that is one factor: real economic stagnation and fear.
Slovak prime minister Robert Fico recently said that Germany’s economy is dragging all European countries down. Do you agree?
Germany is one of Europe’s largest markets and has high purchasing power. All European countries and markets generally benefit from the common internal market with Germany. I therefore think his statement shows a lack of economic understanding.
It is true, however, that Germany has built its economic model largely on traditional industries established more than 100 years ago, whether the automotive or chemical industry. And we have not succeeded in helping innovative companies and new start-ups to advance and build new industries.
If you look at the United States by comparison, a large part of US growth — and I think this will also become a problem for them — does not come from traditional industries, but from new companies that concentrate a large share of economic growth among a few players. If you removed the five largest companies from the US, growth would be almost zero or even negative.
Germany also has a real economic problem linked to demographics, which creates the need for more fundamental reforms. That brings me to the second point. Many people feel that the more radical changes that are needed are not being made by the coalition governments Germany has had for a long time. And that is a real problem, because coalitions work by making compromises.
Yet what would probably be needed is a different kind of compromise: changes that people would feel more fundamentally. Because this is not happening, it creates a degree of tension and unrest.
The third factor is definitely linked to how politics is perceived. And that is driven by social media. I have seen it myself: if I publish more radical videos in which I insult and attack the other side, I get more views and more likes. But when I offer a measured assessment of another politician’s performance, people do not watch the video or do not even see it.
Whether we like it or not, through algorithms as well as our human appetite for scandal, we have created a view of the world that is highly negative and highly extreme. This also damages the cohesion of our society, and it is clearly one of the reasons why people vote more extremely.
For example, in 2024, he criticised Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán in the European Parliament for blocking several decisions in support of Ukraine.
So the AfD has managed to understand these issues in a way that allows it to gain more attention and more votes?
On the economy, the AfD essentially says: “Yes, if we return to a fully German market — Germany first — we will solve the economic problem.” They claim they could deliver great reforms, but when you look at their programme, there is actually nothing in it that makes sense.
And then, of course, on an emotional level, they express very loudly their anger that nothing is being done, and they find one group to blame — the immigrant community. This is the danger of the message they spread. We know from the past what happens when you designate one group — especially in Germany — as responsible for social or economic problems.
How do you view the fact that the CDU, chancellor Friedrich Merz and his interior minister are adopting anti-migration rhetoric very similar to that of the far right?
In my view, this is a strategic mistake. First, because it will not actually weaken the AfD, and second, because it does not offer solutions. I think a differentiated approach to migration would divide it into four categories. One is the challenges linked to integration, which exist and require solutions designed for integration challenges — such as decentralised housing, language courses and labour-market integration.
Then there is the whole issue of labour migration, of which we need much more, given Germany’s demographics — and this is not being handled properly in a way that would make us attractive to international or even European talent.
The third concerns internal security. These issues are often — I can only speak for Berlin — linked to drugs, and this is something that needs to be taken seriously, because many people see the situation deteriorating in some cities and want to feel safe there.
The fourth point concerns asylum and the asylum system, where you have to make a fundamental decision about whether you believe people should have the right to apply for asylum — not automatically receive it, but apply for it — and how to organise this effectively. There is no perfect solution to this.
However, all four elements are lumped together in an oversimplification, with one group blamed in the hope that this will somehow soothe dissatisfaction with economic conditions. And I think there is another, deeper factor at play.
The German chancellor is failing to offer direction — a vision of where we are actually heading as a society, in Germany and in Europe. It is entirely absent. It is not good for a society to lack a positive vision of how things could improve. And if all you say is: “We will blame one group for all our problems,” you are not actually offering a positive vision for society.
Polls suggest that the AfD could secure an absolute majority in Saxony-Anhalt this autumn. It would be the first time since the Second World War that the far right governed in a German federal state. How do you see this? Is Saxony-Anhalt its stronghold, and is the party so successful in eastern Germany?
