To defend itself against Russia, Europe is heavily dependent on its main ally, the United States. Faced with a potential American withdrawal, European countries are closing ranks, and most are planning major rearmament. Taking its cue, on 4 March the European Commission announced ReArm Europe, an €800 billion plan of loans and credits aimed at modernising and re-equipping the militaries of the 27 member states.
Now that the initial shock has worn off, Europe seems keen to respond in a united fashion to Washington’s geopolitical U-turn. A “coalition of the willing” is taking shape, following a summit convened in London by British prime minister Keir Starmer on 2 March,
The putative format for future European defence is “a hybrid”, observes Nathalie Tocci in La Stampa. According to this political scientist and director of the Italian Institute for International Affairs:
“It is not the EU, because within [the EU] there are fifth columns, like Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, who are determined to sabotage Ukraine’s defence, but at the same time the European institutions will play a key role. Using the resources generated and coordinated by the European Commission, the ‘volunteers’ will be able to support Kyiv and better defend themselves.
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The format is not NATO either. On the contrary, it is born of the bitter realisation that the United States is disengaging from Europe. And yet it is NATO, because it involves allies who are not members of the EU – the UK, Norway, Turkey and Canada – but who support Ukraine and who have Europe’s security at heart.”
The chosen format, says Tocci, aims to deal with two kinds of questions. Firstly, “the hypothetical question, over the deployment of a reassurance force in the event of a ceasefire in Ukraine”; and secondly the more concrete scenario in which the war continues, for now, and it therefore becomes “essential that the ‘volunteer’ countries coordinate their support, trying as far as possible to fill the vacuum left by Washington”.
In The Conversation, Tetyana Malyarenko and Stefan Wolff note the “important steps” taken by the UK and EU countries in boosting military spending. “Taken together, and provided the current momentum continues, [this] should accelerate Europe’s awareness of a world in which US security guarantees are no longer absolute.” They acknowledge the enormous challenges facing Europe as it seeks to free itself strategically from the United States, but argue that these are “not insurmountable”:
“The conventional military threat posed by an aggressive and revanchist Russia is more easily manageable with the planned boost to conventional forces and air and cyber defences. Close cooperation with Ukraine will also add critical war-fighting experience which can boost the deterrent effect.”
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Without the US nuclear umbrella, Europe remains vulnerable to Russia’s regular threats to use nuclear weapons. Here, they note some encouraging developments: “[N]ew strategic thinking is emerging. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, has indicated his willingness to discuss a more integrated European nuclear capability. And in Germany, a country with an otherwise very complex relationship with nuclear weapons, such a European approach has been debated, increasingly positively, for some time.”
Now that the political will is in place, the obvious question is how to organise European defence at an industrial level. As Enrico Letta has observed in Le Monde, “the upheavals of recent days make necessary a restructuring” of the defence sector. For the president of the Jacques Delors Institute, it is
“a real paradox [that] European countries are moving forward separately and find themselves forced, in an emergency situation, to spend their taxpayers’ money on non-European defence systems, thereby creating thousands of jobs outside Europe, mainly in the United States.”
As a remedy, he proposes: “creating a common defence market and extending it to the United Kingdom, Norway and Iceland, as well as to the three Balkan countries that are already NATO members and candidates for EU membership: Albania, Northern Macedonia and Montenegro. Relations with Turkey will also have to be addressed. The main objective of this operation is not only to put an end to fragmentation within the EU, both in terms of the defence industry and cooperation between defence systems, but also to overcome Brexit.”
Are European fears about Russia’s intentions justified? Yes, according to Céline Marangé, a researcher on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus at the Strategic Research Institute of the French Military Academy. In a lengthy analysis published in Le Grand Continent, she argues that:
“The end state sought [by the Kremlin] is not limited to the demilitarisation and neutralisation of Ukraine or the conquest of a few devastated territories within their administrative borders. The ultimate objective is rather a dominant and feared Russia, having regained its status as a great power and erased the humiliation of defeat in the Cold War, by pushing back NATO’s borders and destroying the European Union.”
Marangé believes that Europe’s policy of appeasement heretofore “will only fuel Vladimir Putin’s aggressiveness” For this reason, Europe must “act without delay to preserve Ukrainian sovereignty and provide a credible deterrent force” In conclusion: “For the future of Ukraine and the security of Europe as a whole, we need to correctly gauge the danger, to raise public awareness, to prepare for a possible conflict with Russia, and to prevent [Russia] as far as possible from getting back into fighting order.”
In an appeal that we are publishing here, more than 600 leading figures from across Europe pose a simple rhetorical question: ”Is it really not worth spending money on the freedom of the Ukrainian people, and on both their security and ours?”:
“Three years after 24 February 2022, Europeans have still not grasped the full significance of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its implications in Ukraine and far beyond. The Americans, aware of what is at stake in terms of global security in the Far East, are clinging to the illusion of a diplomatic table-turning, ignoring the disastrous consequences of any compromise with the Putin regime, including for Russia itself.”
In the view of the signatories, “the Americans and Europeans have no choice but to finally allocate to Ukraine all the resources that will enable it to defeat Russia militarily”. For these Ukrainian public figures, researchers, journalists and parliamentarians, it is the West as a whole that must respond with a “comprehensive strategy”, accompanied by a special military aid package of 300 billion euros or dollars to Ukraine.
“If we really want peace, we must prepare for war.” With these words, Timothy Garton Ash concludes his latest column for the Guardian. The problem is complacency: “As we have seen in recent days, at the first sign of the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine our publics are desperate to believe that we can quickly revert to our old post-1989 peacetime ways.”
For the British historian and political scientist, it is the duty of Europe’s leaders not just to “rekindle the fighting spirit of Winston Churchill and General De Gaulle, but also to explain honestly to the electorate that we are facing another long struggle”. And to cheer “Long live Europe! Long live Churchillo-Gaullism!”, thus “combining the best of our continent’s two most influential traditions when it comes to a world at war. That’s a formula to which not just Macron and Starmer but perhaps even a majority of European leaders might subscribe.”
In partnership with Display Europe, cofunded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the Directorate‑General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
