Democracy in Europe is constantly under discussion: elections, institutions, extremism, the rule of law. Fewer discuss the civic space itself and the growing difficulties faced by the organisations that sustain democratic life on the ground.
For years, the question of civic space within the EU was largely treated as an external issue, linked to enlargement and democratic transition. Before the 2004 enlargement, significant European funding supported NGOs and civil society organisations working on democratisation, anti-corruption, fundamental rights, and non-discrimination, recognising them as essential pillars of democratic resilience.
But after that enlargement wave of mostly ex-communist countries, much of that structural support faded, as if the need for a strong and protected civil society inside the EU had disappeared. Many organisations warned that democratic backsliding, political pressure, and restrictions on civic participation were not problems confined to Europe’s borders. Today, those warnings are becoming harder to ignore.
Natacha Kazatchkine, secretary general of the European Civic Forum (ECF), reflects on the state of civic space in Europe and what it reveals about the health of European democracy itself.
How has Europe’s “civic space” evolved in recent years, why is it shrinking — and why should ordinary citizens care?
I think there is a realisation of how important civic space is, more than it was some years ago. Twenty years ago, civic space was barely a topic. Human rights, democracy and civic space in the EU usually attract attention only when they are already under attack and the crisis is visible.
Things have evolved. This became particularly clear with Poland and Hungary in 2017-18. The issue was not simply compliance with EU directives, but respect for core commitments and values. EU institutions realised they needed stronger norms and accountability mechanisms, as well as support for the groups defending these values in member states. In that sense, creation of the CERV [Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme] programme, supporting NGOs working on EU values at both national and EU level, was so significant.
The European Civic Forum recently published a report highlighting a democratic erosion in Europe. Based on your research, what emerging trends or tactics most clearly support this assessment?
Our report shows that there is a democratic erosion, yes. As a human rights’ lawyer from Memorial, said once provocatively about democracy : “The tipping point is today. Consider it’s collapsing all the time.”
The report shows trends… one of them is the criminalisation of solidarity with migrants and refugees. Year after year, this has been documented and embedded in policies. Already in the early 2000s migration became a separate and highly toxic political box, and many of the attacks first directed at groups working on migration later spread to other human rights movements.
Another important trend is the restriction of the right to protest and attacks on public spaces during gathering and debates. This is happening across several EU member states, yet the EU still hesitates to fully address issues related to freedom of assembly and police violence during demonstrations. Mobilisation movements have shown their strength: in Hungary, banning the Pride last year led to the largest Pride the country had ever seen. It turned into a broader European demonstration about protecting core EU values. The same applies to mobilisations around Gaza: without these demonstrations, the awareness and pressure we see today would not exist.
A final trend is the growing push for legislation targeting foreign-funded NGOs. Europe has largely been an exception compared to regions where such laws already exist, including Russia, China and elsewhere. Even when presented as transparency or protection against foreign interference, these laws would have deeply stigmatising effects on NGOs and think tanks. This is one of the biggest threats facing civic space today.
We need to be extremely vigilant about everything that is happening. We have seen these trends developing for many years now, which means governments cannot claim they were not warned or did not see the tipping point coming. Making abstract declarations about preserving democracy, while remaining detached from reality, is not responsible. I like to paraphrase feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir: “One is not born, but rather becomes, a democrat.” Democracy is something that is continuously built and shaped through broader power structures.
With the rise of far-right populism, technocratic governance, political apathy, and the weakening of civil society organisations across Europe, which of these trends concerns you most at the moment and why?
Beyond the electoral dimension and the growing alliance between parts of the traditional conservative right and the far-right, is the changing balance of power within institutions. The Scrutiny Working Group in the Parliament on foreign-funded NGOs, initiated by the EPP [European People’s Party], is a striking example of this shift.
There are growing concerns around surveillance and the tools that can be used to monitor citizens, NGOs and journalists. We are seeing structural changes in the regulatory agenda, with faster procedures and a strong push for simplification at both national and EU level.
Many of the gains achieved by civil society at EU level are now being weakened through this simplified approach to lawmaking. This combination of speed, limited debate and the absence of serious discussion about the consequences of legislation is extremely worrying.
The EU: part solution, part problem?
The Forum has argued that some EU policies themselves contribute to shrinking civic space. The EU often criticises democratic backsliding abroad — but how are EU institutions’ specific policies themselves contributing to civic repression?
Migration policies are already part of this broader regulatory agenda, but the problem is also the absence or weakness of EU laws in areas such as anti-discrimination. After the mobilisations following the murder of George Floyd and the Black Lives Matter movement, there was momentum for a stronger EU agenda, but today that ambition has clearly diminished.
There has also been a broader decline in rights-based policymaking. Before there was a strong agenda on procedural rights in criminal proceedings, such as the right to a lawyer or a translator. These issues are barely discussed anymore. At the same time, policies linked to the neoliberal and economic agenda increasingly neglect the role of citizens and reduce the space available to them, often to the benefit of private and powerful economic actors.
What we are seeing is both the absence of a strong normative and proactive policy agenda supporting civil society and citizens’ rights, and direct attacks on civic space itself. This is pushing democracy at the EU level downward, and EU institutions bear responsibility for that.
At EU level, issues always become larger in scale: they can gain more attention, nuance and funding, but they can also become far more contested and aggressive politically. That is exactly what we are seeing now around legislation and civic space.
Does Brussels genuinely listen to civil society — or mostly consult it symbolically?
The main issue today is no longer only symbolic ‘tick-the-box’ consultation, although those examples still exist. The deeper problem is that the EU has failed to establish genuine and continuous consultation with NGOs in policymaking. Civil society has grown alongside EU policies, become more organised, and demonstrated its credibility as a representative interlocutor, yet important channels for democratic participation are still missing.
There is also a major imbalance in accountability. Civil society is increasingly asked to contribute substantial work — for example on the Recovery and Resilience framework, judicial developments in member states, and the monitoring of EU funds. NGOs participate in national committees tracking how these funds are used. But when civil society asks the EU for accountability in return — what actions will follow, why certain recommendations were chosen, or how implementation is progressing — the response is often limited.
At the same time, delegitimising narratives portraying NGOs as disruptive or obstructive are influencing parts of EU institutions and governments, making engagement with civil society more difficult.
The EU new strategy for civil society adopted last year is important because it treats civic space comprehensively — including participation, impact assessments, protection and funding. The risk, however, is that civic space once again becomes treated as a separate issue detached from broader policymaking.
Some parties are calling what is happening on civil society and NGOs a ‘witch hunt’. Why do they call it that, isn’t it too strong a word?
I agree that it is a witch hunt. I would urge the European Parliament to explain clearly to citizens why it is a witch hunt and to take positions that challenge this dynamic. In this context, a witch hunt means scapegoating a particular group in society through false claims, smear campaigns, destabilisation and delegitimisation in order to silence them, discourage free expression, or pressure them into supporting a political agenda.
This is what the Scrutiny Working Group is doing. It promotes the narrative that public money is being wasted on groups supposedly acting against the interests of citizens and governments, and that these organisations are unethical or misuse funds.
NGOs are not immune to corruption or mismanagement, but many controls and accountability mechanisms exist. In Hungary, when the government targeted NGOs through the NGO law and the “Stop Soros” measures, NGOs described it as a strategy to “starve and strangle” civil society.
